Bishops Iker, Duncan File Amicus Brief
Judge Messitte "misunderstood polity of the Episcopal Church"
Robert Stowe England |
21 December 2001
RICHMOND, VA. -- Fort Worth Bishop Jack L. Iker and Pittsburgh Bishop Robert Duncan filed an amicus brief here today in the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the fourth district in support of an appeal by Fr. Samuel L. Edwards and the vestry of St. John's Parish Christ Church, Accokeek, Maryland.
Fr. Edwards and the vestry are appealing a federal court order that, among other things, ousted Fr. Edwards as the traditionalist rector of the parish at the urging of Washington, D.C.'s Acting Bishop Jane Dixon, one of the most ardent revisionist bishops in the Episcopal Church.
Dixon rejected Fr. Edwards as rector after the 30-day limit allowed in the national canons for bishops to review a call made by a vestry, claiming he was unfit to be rector because of his criticisms of ECUSA's departure from historic Christianity. He had written that ECUSA is the "Unchurch" and is "hellbound."
The brief tells the justices of the appeals court that Judge Peter J. Messitte of the U.S. District Court of Maryland's southern division "misunderstood the polity of the Episcopal Church USA, specifically in reference to the nature, power and role of a bishop within the Episcopal Church."
The amicus brief was prepared by Kenneth Matticks of Dallas, Texas, in support of the arguments in a brief filed December 17 by attorney Charles Nalls of deKieffer & Horgan in Washington, D.C., who represents Fr. Edwards and the vestry.
Bishop Iker declared pastoral oversight of Christ Church last May, and Fr. Edwards is canonically resident in Bishop Iker's diocese. Bishop Duncan is the chair of the American Anglican Council, a organization of 40 conservative and orthodox bishops in the Episcopal Church.
Iker and Duncan, "as Bishops of the Church . . . have a vital interest in the correct interpretation of church polity, doctrine and faith, and in maintaining the separation of Church and State," the brief states.
Judge Messitte's order ousting Fr. Edwards also terminated his contract with the vestry, appointed Dixon rector ex officio, prohibited Fr. Edwards from holding services on or within 300 feet of the church property, and ousted his family from the rectory on November 30.
The lower court's misunderstanding of Episcopal Church polity "led to at least three reversible errors in the court's ruling," the brief argues.
Judge Messitte's first mistake was his failure to understand that "the Diocese of Washington is an indispensable party to this suit." Dixon filed her lawsuit as an individual residing in Washington, D.C. against the Maryland parish, establishing the necessary diversity of jurisdiction that is needed to have a case decided in a federal court.
The brief notes that "an Episcopal bishop, unlike perhaps a bishop of the Roman Catholic Church, is governed by the constitution and canons of the Church. An Episcopal Bishop is not an independent authority to act for the Church in his own name." Dixon could not, thus, bring a suit without also including the Diocese of Washington as co-plaintiff. Conversely, the brief argues, the Diocese of Washington could, in fact, bring a suit without the Bishop of Washington as a party.
The brief also charges that "the lower court misconstrued the procedure of the Episcopal Church in calling a rector from one diocese to another, both as to the '30-day rule' and what is meant by the requirement that a prospective rector be 'duly qualified.'"
The brief devotes considerable time discussing the 30-day time limit and concludes it by stating that Judge Messitte's ruling "rewrites and changes ECUSA canon law, and for this reason, the case should be remanded to the lower court for dismissal or a full hearing on the merits not inconsistent with this Court's ruling,"
The lower court's errors, the brief states, point out the necessity for the rationale that has been established in prior cases and rulings "that mandate that courts remain free of ecclesiastical disputes until fully adjudicated within the ecclesiastical bodies and, further, to accept and defer to the decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals," the brief states. "For this reason alone, the trial court erred by not dismissing this case," it adds.
Presentment charges were brought against Dixon last summer for rejecting Fr. Edwards after the 30-day limit in the canons, but the charges were dismissed by the Title IV Review Committee, which is dominated by the church's revisionists.
Presentment charges were drawn up secretly against Fr. Edwards in May by the Rev. Canon John Frizzell, Jr. and 14 other clergy in the Diocese of Washington. Dixon, however, refused to forward them to the Diocese of Fort Worth as the canons require. When the details of the presentment charges were released by Frizzell last July, the Diocese of Fort Worth decided to take up the charges and investigate them.
Earlier this week the Standing Committee of the Diocese of Fort Worth dismissed the charge that Fr. Edwards preached doctrine contrary to the church but issued a presentment against him for the charge that he conducted religious services in the Diocese of Washington without a license past the time limit of 60 days. Fr. Edwards will now stand trial on that charge.
The brief reviews cases, including some brought before the fourth circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, that concluded that courts should avoid involvement in internal church affairs except to enforce a decision arrived at internally in order to prevent an improper intrusion of the state into religious affairs.
The amicus brief also faults lower court erred in grant summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, echoing a charge made in the brief filed by Nalls.
The amicus brief states: "There is credible evidence presented by Appellants Edwards and Vestry on a variety of material facts that was either ignored entirely or discounted by the lower court to reach the decision it annunciated. Simply put, the Court failed to follow the clear dictates of Rule 56 . . . for deciding summary judgment motions."
30-Day Limit and The Interview
The brief devotes considerable space to explaining the polity of the Episcopal Church, particularly as it relates to the 30-day limit and how to determine who is a duly qualified priest.
The brief's tutorial explains: "An episcopal bishop is elected by the laity and clergy of a diocese and must be approved by the House of Bishops and the Standing Committees of the Episcopal Church before being seated as a bishop of the Church."
It continues: "Although given great deference as a leader in much the same way as the President of the United States is given deference, neither the President or an Episcopal bishop acts independently of the checks and balances of the legal system of which they are a part. A bishop must adhere to the constitution and canons of the Church or be subject to discipline. (The brief cites Title III, Canon 24; Title IV: Ecclesiastical Discipline of the Canons of ECUSA on this point.)
The brief faults Messitte for putting "great stock in Appellant Edwards' inability to meet with the Appellee Bishop on the date first proposed by Appellee Bishop."
In doing this, Judge Messitte followed Bishop Dixon's emphasis on the delayed interview as cause for her delay past the 30-day limit.
An interview had been set for early January, before the 30 days had expired, but was rescheduled to early March. After the interview, Dixon announced on March 8 that she was rejecting the call of Fr. Edwards, 83 days after the vestry first notified the diocese it had called Fr. Edwards.
"What the lower court failed to appreciate was that the Appellee Bishop had any number of options to meet her canonically- mandated time period," the brief states. The brief then enumerates three examples of how Dixon could have handled the matter of the interview.
If Dixon was the absolute authority that the lower court concluded that she was, she "could have ordered the Appellant Edwards to appear at a time of her own choosing, and upon his failure to appear, she could have found him not 'duly qualified' within the thirty-day period," the brief states.
If, as Fr. Edwards and Christ Church vestry assert, Bishop Dixon has only the constitutional powers given her by the canons and constitution of ECUSA, the brief notes, then she "could have notified the Vestry that she needed additional time to investigate and seek an agreement with the Vestry to extend the thirty-day period or again, could have sent word to the Vestry that Appellant Edwards was not duly qualified, or even filed a charge on him with the appropriate judicatory body."
The brief finally offers a a simple pragmatic solution to Dixon's interview dilemma. "Had Appellee Dixon had a genuine interest in talking with the Appellant Edwards, she simply could have arranged a telephone conference between herself and Appellant Edwards before the expiration of the thirty-day period," the brief states.
Instead of pursuing any of these options, the brief notes, Dixon "let the time expire."
The brief then faults Judge Messitte for failing "to appreciate that the Canons of ECUSA do not provide for any automatic extension of the thirty-day period in which to communicate with the Vestry whether the proposed rector was 'duly qualified.'"
If Fr. Edwards had deliberately and unilaterally refused to meet with Dixon, "then there might be some basis for the court's reading a reasonable extension of a time limit into the Canons of ECUSA." However, the brief notes, the canons do not mention nor mandate an interview between a bishop and a rector candidate. Nor do they provide for an extension of the 30-day time period.
The brief concludes: "It is not rational to use the lack of a voluntary meeting between Appellee Dixon and Appellant Edwards as the basis for rewriting the Canons of ECUSA by the lower court."
It further faults Dixon for "using her own negligence in exercising her option to find Appellant Edwards not duly qualified within the canonically-mandated time period as the basis for the Court to modify Episcopal canon law to suit Bishop Dixon's own needs."
A Duly Qualified Priest
The amicus brief attacks Dixon's contention that she can determine the meaning of "duly qualified" under Title III, Canon 17, Section 3, and as primary evidence that the lower court misunderstands the polity of ECUSA.
The brief explains why there is a single national standard for what is a duly qualified priest and not varying diocesan standards. "To allow each diocesan bishop absolute freedom to determine who is and is not duly qualified would, in part, render ECUSA a loose association of independent regional church bodies. There must be some national standard by which 'duly qualified' can be determined," the brief states.
The brief explains how Dixon could have gone about determine if Fr. Edwards is a duly qualified priest.
The brief cites the Church Pension Fund as a source for "a working definition of 'duly qualified.'" The brief notes: "Were one interested in determining a priest's formal education, and whether a priest had been regularly ordained as a deacon and had been regularly ordained as a priest, such records are officially maintained by the Church Pension Board."
The brief also notes that a bishop could easily determine whether or not charges had been brought against a priest or whether a priests had been suspended, removed or deposed by contact the Recorder of the Episcopal House of Deputies. Dixon could have found any negative information on Dixon at any time by contacting the Recorder, the brief states.
The brief points out that Dixon could also have consulted Bishop Iker to find out of there was any "informal information . . . concerning the character and fitness of Appellant Edwards to assume the rectorship of St. John's Parish."
The brief concludes on this point: "The undisputed fact is that there is nothing negative in Appellant Edwards' education, experience, character or fitness that would negatively impact his selection of rector by Appellant Vestry. Even Appellee Dixon raised no objection to Rev. Edwards' qualifications or moral character."
The basis for Dixon's rejection is "hotly contested among the parties," the brief notes and is one of the issues that would benefit from a full airing at a trial on the merits, a trial that was prevented by Judge Messitte's summary judgment, the brief notes.
The brief then pinpoints the issue before the appeals court: "How could a priest be duly qualified in one diocese of ECUSA, and without a change in any facts or indices about that priest, be found not qualified in another diocese of the same church?"
If a bishop has absolute, unchecked authority to decide if a priest is or is not duly qualified, then a decision could be based on a personal whim, the brief notes. "However, in a constitutionally ordered church such as ECUSA that freely permits movement of its clergy between dioceses, the decision of a bishop must be governed by a more objective standard."
The brief contends that "Dixon stepped beyond the boundaries of her canonical authority and abused her authority. " The lower court, in sanctioning her decision, has undermined the church's polity, it concludes.
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